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THE BRITISH DOCTRINE OF
PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY:
A CRITICAL INQUIRY
Roy Stone de Montpensier
The purport of this argument is that Dicey and other legal
positivists, Austin and Bentham among them, have propounded
a spurious doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty because they
have uncritically accepted a mistake of Blackstone, who in turn
has mistakenly construed Coke's remarks on the nature and
analysis of sovereignty, or better, the supremacy, of the High
Court of Parliament.
The law as a whole is a calculus,' self-contained and selfexplanatory, like a circle within which in geometry it is possible
to trace the delineaments of the two-dimensional plane contained within the circle, as Waissman explains in his Essay on
Language Strata; or like language which is also like a circle that is, as Dr. Johnson explains, a lexicographer sees language
by giving definitions of words by reference to other words, and
those words by other words, so that in the end words like buck
and doe, female and male, he and she, are tautologous in the
sense that the one has to refer to the other. If we look at the
law in this sense, as a complicated series of rules of a game, we
shall not be inclined to ask misleading questions about how law
derives its authority, and we shall not ask the sort of question
that Austin was forced to ask when he defined the province of
jurisprudence by reference to theories of command, of sovereignty, of sanction, of obedience, etc. Nor shall we ask, because
it would not occur to us to consider, whether Parliament is supreme or how it is that the common law could overrule a statute.
Nor would we be drawn to conclude, because a statute could re*Barrister-at-law. Cambridge, England.
1. Calculus. The law considered as a calculus reflected two sources. The first
is 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 11 (2d ed. 1899), where
estates are described as a calculus of rights, projected upon the plane of time;
the other is the point that the law, like mathematics, exists whatever theory we
may set up to account for it, conventional, intuitionist, etc. The point is put by
Whistler in his attack on Ruskin in respect of art: "As well might he ask
what is to become of mathematics under similar circumstances, were they possible.
I maintain that two and two the mathematician would continue to make four,
in spite of the whine of the amateur for three, or the cry of the critic for five."
Whistler, The Gentle Art of Making Enemies, quoted in KINOSMILL,
AND ABUSE 196 (1944).
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peal the common law in the way in which the Law of Property
Act of 1925 overruled the rule in Shelley's Case, that statutes are
omnipotent, superior to, sovereign over, the common law. And
further we should not be led, as were Blackstone, Austin, Dicey
and a whole host of writers on constitutional law, political theory, or history and jurisprudence, to assert in seeking a concept
of sovereignty that Parliament can do anything except bind its
successors.
In a modern jurisprudential setting there are rules of law,
functions of the calculus, which describe, delineate, and define
the position or the personality of the Crown in relation to all
those other rules, functions of the calculus, which described,
delineated, and defined the rights and duties of others. That
the law might not completely articulate every conceivable rule
to cover every conceivable situation does not entail supremacy
over the law. The King and the Parliament, if we may use a
metaphor, are like icebergs swimming in a sea of laws, twothirds submerged and one-third riding above the sea. Their
personality, however, is founded in the law. To this extent both
King and Parliament can be said to be bound by the law, that is,
all law. In this sense, then, neither Kings nor Parliament are
superior to the law, are supreme, are sovereign, though they may
make the laws as part of the whole law. It is submitted that
this is the true position and this dispels or at least places within
context any absolute claim of a divine-right-of Kings jurisprudence or a supremacy-of-Parliament case.
The mysteries which upset us about writing on the Constitution are threefold. The first is that there is a competition between the sources of law which is resolved not by the due and
appropriate application of different rules within the function
of the legal calculus, but by creating a superiority of one rule
over another. 2 The second is the wholly false attribution to the
2. MARSHALL, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE COMMONWEALTH

(1957)

makes some good points in a very full survey, but he does not distinguish enough
between a legal account of sovereignty, a historical account and a theoretical
account. He certainly notices, for he quotes !Sir Ivor Jennings with approval to
the effect that legal precedents are not historical precedents. The following is
his account of the program to elucidate not the nature of sovereignty, not what
sovereignty is, but in what set of rules is sovereignty appropriately used. The
resulting conflict between academic logic and the facts of political life is an effective reminder that the traditional linguistic garb in which the theory of sovereignty

has been clothed is an embarrassing apparel for a Parliament which passed the
Statute of Westminster to make Dominion independence a legal reality.
"The language in which propositions about legal sovereignty have been formu-
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English Constitution of the separation of powers into the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary, a doctrine propounded by
Montesquieu, which may have been acted on in drawing up some
constitutions, particularly that of the United States. In spite of
its inapplicability to the English Constitution this misconception
has had a deep effect upon jurisprudence and legal theory in
leading men to believe that the functions of the legislature, of
the executive, and of the judiciary are in competition, when they
are, in reality and within the memory of historians, vested in
the Crown. Blackstone described such a use of Parliament:
"And the king and these three estates, together, form the great
corporation or body politic of the kingdom." To consider separate what is disparate has encouraged that competitive view of
the sources of law among one another. The third mystery is to
treat of Parliament without carefully showing that Parliament
might mean one of three things. It might mean the institution
that has had some traceable and fairly continuous identity since
the Model Parliament, and which gives advice to the Crown in
making statutes. It might mean one Parliament as distinct from
another Parliament, as the Rump was distinct from the Long
or the Model Parliament. Or it might mean one session of Parliament in this last sense as opposed to another. To confuse these
senses is to invite unnecessary difficulties. When it is asserted
as a legal rule that Parliament cannot bind its successors, it is
difficult to know what a successor to Parliament is. In England
so far we have had no successors to Parliament unless the Parliament following upon the Treaty of Union with Scotland in
1707 was a successor to the Parliament of England existing imlated is inevitably a language which leans upon traditional (and questionable)
pieces of vocabulary in jurisprudence and political science. Questions, for example,
asked about the parliamentary 'sovereign' have been put in the following way.
What is sovereignty? What can a sovereign do? What limits can be placed

upon its action? Can it bind itself or its successors? And the answers proferred
have been that the sovereign body is legally illimitable; that it 'cannot' be bound;
that it 'cannot' place limits on its own or future action. But the substitution
of such queries is What rules govern and define the legislative process?, or Under
what conditions may rules of this kind be revised? (the answers to which need
not -be determined by any theory about the nature, or power, or commands of
'bodies' or legal entities) may in themselves suggest different answers. The term
*sovereignty' seems an eminently suitable candidate for a programme aimed at
substituting questions having this form for questions of the form What 's an X.
"Seen in this light the question raised by the Statute of Westminster and the

United Kingdom 'abdication' becomes not whether a sovereign entity has effectively limited its future action, but whether the rules formulating and defining

the elements competent to legislate in Britain and the Commonweath have been
amended." Id. at 39-40.
3. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *153.
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mediately before the Act of Union. If Parliament is that shifting and springing continuum we can trace and identify and individuate since the Model Parliament, we do not know whether
it can or cannot bind its successors: it seems not inconceivable
that it could, for the reason that in dissolving itself and creating
a constituent assembly it would make law by which the constituent assembly would be bound - the same law which I would
argue is binding on King, on people, and on Parliament alike.
If Parliament is considered as existing from one prorogation and
general election to the next, then it is true that one such Parliament cannot bind its successors, but this is no more alarming
than such propositions as that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal is not binding upon the Court of Appeal, or that the
decision of one county court judge is not binding upon another.
Nor, indeed, is it any more alarming than the rule that the House
of Lords is bound by its own decisions. At all events, if this is
what is meant, the decision is trivial and nothing very much
about sovereignty should be deduced from the rule. If the rule
means that one session cannot bind the next, it i not either
alarming or important.
These three considerations, however, have been largely responsible for building up a theory of parliamentary supremacy,
and so a theory of sovereignty. I shall argue that the theory is
an attempt to replace what has been misunderstood, certainly
in English history and in English law.
PART I. COKE'S THEORY OF PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY

I wish first to turn to Coke's Institutes, particularly the
Fourth which deals with the High Court of Judicature, that is,
with Parliament as a High Court with the House of Lords and
the House of Commons each as a court, and with the other courts
of the land, common law courts, the court of chancery, etc. It is
in this Institute, which was written in retirement and published
posthumously by the order of Parliament itself, that we find the
first authoritative germs of a theory of parliamentary sovereignty. I use the word authoritative to distinguish the broader
claims of pamphleteers and speeches in Parliament from those
which have some weight as precedent in the legal game. Coke is
what Bacon thought Littleton and Fitzherbert to be, "institutions of our law," and what Coke said might therefore have to
be considered as binding in any jurisprudential analysis of soy-
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ereignty. We must therefore discover how far Coke went in
the Institute to propound his theory of parliamentary sovereignty, or of parliamentary supremacy. I wish here to query
whether Coke departed from his position of considering Kings
and Parliaments to be rooted in the law, to ask whether what
is clearly a dogmatic and probably correct statement of the law
that certain matters appertaining to the laws of commons and
certain things belonging to bills and acts were ultra vires common law entails a jurisprudential theory or analysis that the
law was not to be treated as a whole but that the common law
was somehow superior to all other sources of law save and except Parliament, that is the statute law, "what Parliament
made" and the lex et consuetudo parliamenti,the law which governs Parliament. Finally, we must ask whether terms such as
higher, sovereign, supreme, superior, are matters of exaggeration, hyperbole, or metaphor, or whether they are substantives
containing substance. In short, did Coke in the Institutes resile
4
from his opinions in the following cases: (a) Articuli eleri,
5
6
7
(b) Prohibitions, (c) Proclamations, (d) Non obstante, (e)
Bonham's Case s (f) Commendams?9
"Sovereign power is no Parliament word." In what sense
does Coke use the words "sovereign" and "supreme"? Curiously,
he does not use them in relation to the Parliament, but in relating to the position which he attributes to the Court of the King's
Bench in the judicial hierarchy: "It is truly said that the justices de banco regis have supream authority, the king himself
sitting there as the law intends. They be more than justices in
eire.
"The justices in this court are the soveraign justices of oier
and terminer, gaol-delivery, conservators of the peace, &c. in the
realm. See the books in the margent, you shall find excellent
matter of learning concerning the supream jurisdiction of this
court.
"In this court the kings of this realm have sit in the high
bench, and the judges of that court on the lower bench at this
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
field,

2 STATE TRIALS 134.
Case of Prohibitions, 13 Co. Rep. 30, 77 Eng. Rep. 1440 (1607).
Case of Proclamations, 12 Co. Rep. 74, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352 (K.B. 1611).
Case of Non Obstante, 12 Co. Rep. 18, 77 Eng. Rep. 1300 (1610).
8 Co. Rep. 106b, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610).
Commendam Case, sub nom. Colt & Glover .v. Bishop of Coventry & LichHob. 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 290 (K.B. 1612).
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foot; but judicature only belongeth to the judges of that court,
and in his presence they answer all motions, &c.
"The justices of this court are the soveraign coroners of the
land, and therefore where the sherif and coroners may receive
appeals by bill, d fortiorithe justices of this court may do it.
"So high is the authority of this court, that when it comes
and sits in any county, the justices of eire, or oier and terminer,
gaol-delivery, they which have conusance, &c. doe cease without
any writing to them. But if any indictment of treason or felony
in a foraign county be removed before certain commissioners of
oier and terminer in the county where this court sits, yet they
may proceed, because this court (for that this indictment was
not removed before them) cannot proceed for that offence. But
if an indictment be taken in Midd. in the vacation, and after this
court sits in the next term in the same county (if this court
be adjourned) then may speciall commissioners of oier and
terminer, &c., in the interim proceed upon that indictment, but
the more usuall way is by speciall commission. And all this was
resolved by all the judges of England at Winchester term, anno
I Jacobi regis, in the case of Sir Everard Digby and others; and
so had it been resolved, Mich. 25 & 26 Eliz. in the case of Arden
and Somervile, for this kind of speciall commission of oier and
terminer." 10
This passage precedes Coke's description and short history of
the Court of Common Pleas. It is a strange use of supreme and
sovereign if it is intended to show Coke's support of King's
Bench as something more than coordinate with the Court of
Common Pleas. In theory their jurisdictions were mutually exclusive though in practice a series of fictions enabled them to
filch jurisdiction the one from the other. Insofar as they were
rivals their rivalry did not derive from that disposition of the
King's power of judicature which Bracton, cited with approval
by Coke, ascribed to the separate jurisdictions of these courts
as early as the reign of Henry III. There is no evidence that
Coke was referring to these fictions and rivalries, and it may
well be that the better opinion is that supreme and sovereign
are used metaphorically. "To speak plainly," Coke said, "this
will overthrow all our Petition. It trenches to all parts of it; it
10. COKE, INSTITUTES

(1797).

OF THE

LAWS

OF ENGLAND:

THE FOURTH PART

73
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flies at loans, and at the oath, at imprisonment and at the billeting of soldiers. This turns all about again. Look into the petitions of formpr times! They never petitioned wherein there was
a saving of the King's sovereignty. I know that prerogative is
part of the law, but sovereign power is no Parliamentary word.
Should we now add it, we shall weaken the foundation of law
and then the building must needs fall. Take heed what we yield
unto! Magna Charta is such a fellow that he will have no sovereign. I wonder this 'sovereign' was not in Magna Charta,
or in the confirmation of it? If we grant this, by implication
we give a sovereign power above all these laws. 'Power' in law,
is taken for a power with force: 'The Sheriff shall take the
power of the county.' What it means here, God only knows. It is
repugnant to our Petition that is a Petition of Right, grounded
on acts of Parliament. We must not admit of it, and to qualify
it is impossible. Let us hold our privileges according to the
law."'" There is, of course, some evidence that the Chief Justiceship of the King's Bench was somehow a better position than
that of the Common Pleas, although it is asserted that Coke was
demoted when he was translated from the Common Pleas to the
King's Bench. This was because the Chief Justiceship of the
Common Pleas was a richer office. There is evidence that, as
the Common Pleas did not have jurisdiction over pleas of the
Crown, Coke's supposed antipathy to prerogative rule by James I
would be assuaged and that he would be a more compliant judge
in the King's Bench than he had been in the Common Pleas.
This was to prove both a false assumption and a bad bet on the
part of the King. We see none of this reflected in the Fourth
Institute. If supreme and sovereign were words expressive of
legal, jurisprudential, or indeed philosophical theory reflecting
power, authority, prerogative and an overall capacity, we would
have expected Coke to use the words in connection with the position of the High Court of Parliament. All Coke does is to enunciate the rules of the law appertaining to Parliament, perhaps
in the same high-flown style.
"And as every court of justice hath laws and customs for
its direction, some by the common law, some by the civill and
canon law, some by peculiar lawes and customs, &c. So the
high court of parliament suis propiis legibus et consuetudinibus
subsistit. It is lex et consuetudo parliamenti, that all weighty
11. 3 STATE TRIALS 18D-94; 2 CoSSETT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 357.
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matters in any parliament moved concerning the peers of the
realm, or commons in parliament assembled, ought to be determined, adjudged, and discussed by the court of the parliament,
and not by the civill law, nor yet by the common laws of this
realm used in more inferior courts; which was so declared to be
secundum legem et consuetudinem parliamenti, concerning the
' 12
peers of the realm.
This seems to me to be a rule of law which declares nothing
new, that Parliament and its privileges should be governed according to its own law and custom. It is no more conducive to
a sovereign theory than the old rules which gave clerks of the
common pleas a right to have actions which would otherwise
have fallen within the jurisdiction of other courts, both common law and courts of conscience, heard in the common pleas.
So too the Latin side of chancery admitted common law claims
in suits between clerks and others attached to chancery and other
persons when other courts would ordinarily have been competent. It was this sort of jurisdiction which Bacon was asserting
as being peculiarly appropriate to matters concerning the King's
prerogative powers and title in the Assize of Brownlow v.
Michell.18 The earlier disputes concerning benefit of clergy and
the competence of the ecclesiastical courts to try questions concerning ecclesiastical lands is no greater an assertion of sovereign power or supremacy. In Bates case 14 the Barons of the
Exchequer argued in part that the "records of this Court" were
not general matters of the common law. It is not surprising
that this doctrine was argued, and argued unconvincingly, for
in places the barons themselves conceived that the records of the
Exchequer were matters of common law, and in any case within
a matter of a decade were to become such. I neither want to
minimize nor to maximize the maxim that the 1ex et consuetudo
parliamenti is outside the ordinary rules of the common law.
What I do want to maintain is that they are part of the common law, in its general and undivided sense of which common
law was but one source. How far Parliament could act outside
the lex et consuetudo parliamentiis a question that does not seem
to be asked. The tenor of Coke suggests that it could not. Of
12. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: THE FOURTH PART 14
(1797).
13. Bacon, The Argument in The Case De Rege Inconsulto (1616), in 15
THE WORKS OF FRANCIS

BACON 257

(Spedding

14. Lane 22, 145 Eng. Rep. 267 (Ex. 1606).

etc. ed.)
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course what is meant here by Parliament is a matter for discussion. Both Coke and I have in mind that springing and shifting continuum possessed of a distinct personality which in fits
and starts has continued since the Model Parliament. Bacon
when ascribing to Parliament a supreme will talks of "Parliament and its successors." He is talking of one Parliament
from election to prorogation in comparison with a later Parliament from election to prorogation. This takes much pith out
of the argument that Bacon conceived of Parliament as sovereign. "For a supreme and absolute power cannot conclude
15
itself."'
Coke makes a celebrated remark about Parliament, or rather
the power of Parliament in respect of passing bills or in respect
of what a bill could or could not do. 16 It is worth noticing that
the words "sovereign" and "supreme" are not used in this connection. Holdsworth remarks, perhaps not surprisingly for one
who seems to be a Parliament man: "In the Fourth Institute,
when he is dealing specifically with the powers of Parliament,
and in other passages, he admits its supremacy freely and
fully.'

7

The words of the Institute, however, are "Of the power

and jurisdiction of the parliament, for making of laws in proceeding by bill, it is so transcendent and absolute, as it cannot be
confined either for causes or persons within any bounds."' 18
There is here nothing of sovereignty or supremacy in Coke, but
merely a description perhaps high-flown of what after all is a
rule of law, a placitum legum. Holdsworth substantiates his argument in the following manner: "talking of an act of attainder,
he [Coke] clearly distinguishes the expediency of a law from
the power to make it; ibid 42, 43, 'Acts against the power of subsequent Parliaments bind not'; cp. Second Instit. 498, where a
record of Edward I's reign is cited to the effect that 'the award
of Parliament was the highest law that could be;' Co. Litt. 155b,
'the common law hath no controller in any part of it but the
high court of Parliament, and if it be not abrogated or altered
by Parliament it remains still.' "9 It is interesting that Holds15. Bacon, History of the Reign of King Henry VII (1622), in 11 THE WORKS
OF FRANCIS BACON 240 (Spedding etc. ed.)
16. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:

THE FOURTH

PART

36

(1797).
17. 4 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 187 (1924).
18. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: THE FOURTH PART 36

(1797).
19. 4

HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH

LAW

187 (1924).
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worth should cite in support of the supremacy of Parliament
the very imprecise and rather uninformative rule that "'acts
against the power of subsequent Parliaments bind not'"; Coke
in fact refers to Acts of Henry VIII which seem to preclude
subsequent acts of Parliament from being introduced, but such
acts were introduced. Bacon also makes the same point in his
life of Henry VII, in the Maxims of the Law, and in his arguments of the Commission of Bridewell. He does at least make it
clear that he is talking about separate Parliaments, or sessions
of Parliament, and not Parliament as a continuum with some
personality.
"The principal law that was made this Parliament was a law
of a strange nature, rather just than legal, and more magnanimous than provident. This law did ordain, That no person that
did assist in arms or otherwise the King for the time being,
should after be impeached therefore, or attainted either by the
course of law or by act of Parliament; but if any such act of
attainder did hap to be made, it should be void and of none effect; for that it was agreeable to reason of estate that the subject should not inquire of the justness of the King's title or
quarrel, and it was agreeable to good conscience that (whatsoever the fortune of the war were) the subject should not suffer
for his obedience .... But the force and obligation of this law
was in itself illusory, as to the latter part of it; (by a precedent
act of Parliament to bind or frustrate a future). For a supreme
and absolute power cannot conclude itself, neither can that which
is in nature revocable be made fixed; no more than if a man
should appoint or declare by his will that if he made any later
will it should be void. And for the case of the act of Parliament,
there is a notable precedent of it in King Henry the Eighth's
time; who doubting he might die in the minority of his son, procured an act to pass, That no statute made during the minority
of a King should bind him or his successors, except it were confined by the King under his great seal at his full age. But the
first act that passed in King Edward the Sixth's time, was an act
of repeal of that former act; at which time nevertheless the
King was minor. But things that do not bind may satisfy for
'' 20
the time.
20. Bacon, History of the Reign of King Henry VII (1622), in 11 THR WORKS
OF FRAN CS BACON 240 (Spedding etc. ed.)
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The comment "for a supreme and absolute power cannot conclude itself" must, I think, be taken to refer to what immediately preceded it, "by a precedent act of Parliament to bind or
frustrate a future," that is to say,. Act of Parliament. There
seems no warrant in this observation of Bacon that supreme and
absolute related to Parliament as a separate personality or entity. This statement represents a rule of law which it is thought
is neutral so far as the sovereignty of Parliament is concerned.
In the Maxims of the Law Bacon's comment on Regula XIX
which concerned the King's prerogative in respect of non obstante raises the query nearer the mark when he discusses the
effect of an act of Parliament which enacted that no more Parliaments should be held. His words are:
"So if an act of parliament be made wherein there is a clause
contained, that it shall not be lawful for the king, by authority
of parliament during the space of seven years, to repeal and
determine the same act; this is a void clause, and the same
act may be repealed within the years. And yet if the parliament
should enact in the nature of the ancient lex regia, that there
should be no more parliaments held, but that the King should
have the authority of the parliament; this act were good in law;
quia potestas suprema seipsum dissolvere potest, ligare non
potest: for as it is in the power of man to kill a man, but it is
not in his power to save him alive and to restrain him from
breathing or feeling; so it is in the power of parliament to extinguish or transfer their own authority, but not, whilst the
authority remains entire, to restrain the functions and exer'21
cises of the same authority.
Bacon here raises the question, if we may use the language
of Dicey and de Toqueville, whether Parliament as a continuum
could make a law abolishing itself, or whether it could make a
law creating a new legislative assembly which was not a constituent assembly, that is to say, an assembly which could make
laws but which could not alter its own constitution. There seems
to be no reason why such a position should not obtain. The better view of Bacon's comment seems to us to be that Bacon distinguishes in these passages between acts of Parliament and
sessions of Parliament and particular parliaments on the one
hand and Parliament as a continuum, the High Court of Parlia21. Bacon, Maxims of the Law BACON 253 (Spedding etc. ed.)

Regula XIX, in 14 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS
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ment, on the other. There is not that mixed confusion which
leads later writers to think that because Parliament can do anything but bind its successors, "it," being confused and ill-defined,
is sovereign.
"So in 28 of K. H. VIII chap. 17. there was a statute made,
that all acts that passed in the minority of kings, reckoning the
same under years of twenty-four, might be annulled and revoked by their letters patents when they came to the same years;
but this act of the first of K. Ed. VI (who was then between
the years of ten and eleven) cap. 11. was repealed, and a new
law surrogate in place thereof; wherein a more reasonable liberty was given, and wherein, though other laws are made revocable according to the provision of the former law with some new
form prescribed, yet that very law of revocation, together with
•pardons,. is made irrevocable and perpetual. So that there isa
direct contrariety and repugnancy between these two laws: for
if the former stands, which maketh all latter laws during the
minority of kings revocable without exception of any law whatsoever, then that very law of repeal is concluded in the generality, and so itself made revocable; on the other side that law,
making no doubt of the absolute repeal of the first law, though
itself were made during the minority, which was the very case
of the former law, in the new provision which it maketh hath a
precise exception, that the law of repeal shall not be repealed.
But the law is, that the first law by the impertinency of it was
void ab initio et ipso facto without repeal: as if a law were made,
that ,nonew statute should be made during seven years, and the
same statute be repealed within the seven years; if the first statute should be good, then no repeal could be made thereof within
that time; for the law of repeal were a new law, and that were
disabled by the former law; therefore it is void in itself, and the
rule holds, perpetua lex est, nullam legem humanam ac positivam
perpetuam esse; et clausula quae abrogationem excludit initio
22
non valet."
In the discourse upon the Commission of Bridewell, Bacon
argued that "if any Charter be granted by a King the which is
repugnant to the Maxims, Customs, or Statutes of the Realm;
then is the Charter void. And it is either by quo warranto or by
scire factas (as learned men have left precedents) to be repealed.
Anno 19: Ed. 3.
22. Id. at 254.
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"That a King's grant either repugnant to law, custom, or statute is not good nor pleadable in the law, see what precedents
' 2
thereof have been left by our wise forefathers.
"Hitherto ye see it very plainly that neither procurement nor
act done either by the King or any other person, or any act of
Parliament, or other thing may in any ways alter or change any
'24
one, point contained in the said great Charter of England.
Remembering St. Germain's divisions of the law into six
heads and Bacon's into three, and remarking the jurisprudential
point that the law is a calculus whose functions or rules may conflict but not compete in the sense that this or that rule or this
or that source of law is supreme or sovereign, Bacon's observations in the discourse do not seem to conflict with Coke's observations in Bonham's case. "In many cases, the common law will
controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be
utterly void."' 25 This is not a startling dictum, especially when
the equity of the statutes was a doctrine of the common law. It
is not thought that Holdsworth's observation "I do not forget
that Coke sometimes writes as if he believed in the supremacy
of a law which even Parliament could not change" 26 is warranted or supported by Coke's writings as a whole. Professor
Thorne has adequately laid Bonham's case in perspective. 27 The
equity of the statute or "l'equite de la statut" was described by
Plowden as "Equitas est correctio legis generatione latae qua
parte defite."2 Coke says "per l'equite de la statut": "Equity is
a construction made by the Judges that cases out of the letter
of a statute yet being within the same mischief or cause of the
making of the same shall be within the same remedy that the
statute provideth: and the reason thereof is, for that the lawmakers could not possibly set down all cases in express terms."' 29
It is submitted that Coke does not go as far as alleging any
doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament. It is Blackstone's
Commentaries upon the Laws of England, commenting upon and
23. Bacon, A Brief Discourse upon the Commission of Bridewell, in 15 THE
12 (Spedding etc. ed.)
24. Id. at 16.
25. 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (C.B. 1610).
26. 4 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 186 (1924).
27. Thorne, 54 L.Q. REV. 543.
28. PLOWDEN, REPORTS 465.
29. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: THE FIRST PART 24b
(1797).
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interpolating and interpreting Coke, which is perhaps the first
legally authoritative opinion about the sovereignty of Parliament.8
PART II.

BLACKSTONE'S THEORY: HIS INTERPOLATION OF COKE

Blackstone's starting point, his hypothesis and assumptions,
are somewhat naive. For example, he accepts tacitly a distinction between governor and governed. From this assumption it
is easy to be led into a doctrine of sovereignty. Society, or the
polis, is more complicated than this.8 ' Blackstone's words are:
"We are next to treat of the rights and duties of persons,
as they are members of society, and stand in various relations
to each other. These relations are either public or private: and
we will first consider those that are public.
"The most universal public relation, by which men are connected together, is that of government; namely, as governors.
and governed; or, in other words, as magistrates and people. Of
magistrates, some also are supreme, in whom the sovereign
power of the state resides; others are subordinate, deriving all
their authority from the supreme magistrate, accountable to
him for their conduct, and acting in an inferior secondary
82
sphere."
Blackstone writes the commentaries very much as a lawyer.
The last gobbet echoes Roman law with its talk of magistrates,
and we discern hints of imperium et potestas. He does cite what
he calls "Locke, and other theoretical writers, 3 8 one whom he
quotes being Montesquieu, but he disapproves of and dismisses
them in the following manner: "'there remains still inherent
in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative,
when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed
in them: for, when such trust is abused, it is thereby forfeited,
and devolves to those who gave it.' ,,34 Blackstone's comment
upon this is narrowly legal, and it shows that Blackstone had in
mind a legal account of the Constitution, but one which was
30. See 1
STITUTION

BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

*160-61;

DICEY,

46 (5th ed. 1897).

31. BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, SOVEREIGNTY
32. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*145.

33. Id. at *161.
34. Ibid.

ch. 2 (1957).
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seen through a concept of the law which he himself had articulated earlier in the Commentaries,3 5 that is, the fiction that the
judges declared, did not make, law; and it was seen through
a jurisprudence which accepted at least a partial distinction
between executive and legislature. "But however just this conclusion may be in theory, we cannot practically adopt it, nor
take any legal steps for carrying it into execution under any
dispensation of government at present actually existing. For
this devolution of power, to the people at large, includes in it
a dissolution of the whole form of government established by
that people; reduces all the members to their original state of
equality; and, by annihilating the sovereign power, repeals all
positive laws whatsoever before enacted. No human laws will
therefore suppose a case, which at once must destroy all law,
and compel men to build afresh upon a new foundation; nor
will they make provision for so desperate an event, as must
render all legal provisions ineffectual."3 6
Blackstone's description, partially historical, of the divisions
of law seems to make the break with the view of law which
we have suggested both Coke and Bacon, and indeed Bracton,
held that it was indeed a calculus consisting of several sources.
True, Blackstone cites Fortescue as saying that Parliament
makes laws,87 and this shows that in the fifteenth century perhaps some distinguished between this all-embracing concept of
law as binding on both King and people. Blackstone's definitio"ns of law are distinguished between lex non scripta in which
he includes common law, custom, and special custom, and lex
scripta, which is statute law. But for him law (and he calls this
"municipal law") is " 'a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the
supreme power in a state.' "38 "Municipal law, thus understood,
is properly defined to be 'a rule of civil conduct prescribed by
the supreme power in a state, commandifig what is right and
prohibiting what is wrong.'-39 This definition of law perhaps
proceeds from and leads to Blackstone's conclusion, 40 for legislature, as was before observed, is the greatest act of superiority
that can be exercised by one being over another. 41 "Wherefore
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at *69.
Id. at *161-62.
Id. at *164.
Id. at *46.
Id. at *44.
Id. at *46.
Blackstone's use of legislature is not always clear, and may in places

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

it is requisite to the very essence of a law, that it be made by
the supreme power. Sovereignty and legislature are indeed convertible terms; one cannot subsist without the other. ' 42 This
leads. to the dichotomy between lex scripta and lex non scripta,
a dichotomy the more significant because Blackstone seems to
think they are different sorts of law and not merely different
sources of law. The common law which he describes is for him
lex non scripta,43 although he acknowledges the records and the
precedents and the books of wise men as sources of this law.
This lex non scripta is not made. He describes its enunciation
in these classic words: "For it is an established rule to abide
by former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation: as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and
not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion; as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is
now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of
any subsequent judge to alter or vary from according to his private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not according
to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws
and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law,
but to maintain and expound the old one. Yet this rule admits
of exception, where the former determination is most evidently
contrary to reason; much more if it be clearly contrary to the
divine law. But even in such cases the subsequent judges do
not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one
' 44
from misrepresentation.
Here then we find the germs of Blackstone's interpretation;
sovereignty and legislature are equivalences; the legislature
makes laws; judges or the common law declares and determines
law. "Make" is a stronger word than "declare" or "determine,"
be inconsistent. Generally he seems to signify by it ius dare (making law), but
when he distinguishes between divine law and natural law and says that there
are certain matters which are indifferent to both, then it is open for human
law to make unlawful what was not so before. He uses legislature as if it included
lex non 8cripta, as well as lex scripta. His example certainly is taken from a
statute but his point must include law generally. "But, with regard to matters
that are in themselves indifferent, or are not commanded or forbidden by those
superior laws,-such, for instance, as exporting of wool into foreign countries,here the inferior legislature has scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make
that action unlawful which before was not so." Id. at *43.
42. Id. at *46.
43. Id. at *62.
44. Id. at *69-70. See further id. at *73: "And thus much for the first ground
and chief corner-stone." I do not think this is anything more than hyperbole.
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so that the shift into considering the statute laws as somehow
more powerful than common law is an easy step. How easy a
step is seen from the tenor of Blackstone's Commentaries when
compared with Coke's Institutes. To Coke, as we have shown,
statutes are transcendent and absolute, the King's Bench is the
sovereign court and the supreme jurisdiction. To Blackstone,
Parliament is sovereign and supreme and his authority is the
citation from Coke attributing to Parliament a transcendency.
How significant these verbal distinctions are must later be discussed. This is how Blackstone deals with the celebrated passage from the Fourth Institute: "The power and jurisdiction
of parliament, says Sir Edward Coke, is so transcendent and
absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons,
within any bounds. And - of this high court, he adds, it may be
truly said, 'si antiquitatem spectes, est vetustissima; si dignitatem, est honoratissima;si jurisdictionem, est capacissima.' It
hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and
expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or
criminal: this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all gpvernments reside somewhere, is entrusted
by the constitution of these kingdoms. 45
It is in the nuance contained in the words "making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and
expounding of laws" that Blackstone shows his position. We
shall see later what his evidence for this proposition is. He confounds and confuses Parliament the Corporation with Parliament the Session, and in so confusing these two identities he
confounds what is within the power of one with what is within
the power of the other. "All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the
laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It
can regulate or new-model the succession to the crown; as was
done in the reign of Henry VIII and William III. It can alter
the established religion of the land; as was done in a variety
of instances, in the reigns of King Henry VIII. and his three
children. It can change and create afresh even the constitution
of the kingdom and of parliament themselves; as was done by
the act of union, and the several statutes for triennial and
45. Id. at *160. See text at note 12 supra.
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septennial elections. It can, in short, do everything that is not
naturally impossible ;46 and therefore some have not scrupled to
call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of
parliament. True it is, that what the parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo.1 47 Equating the power of Parliament to protract its length to three or seven years with the
power of Parliament to change its constitution is, it is thought,
a confusion of two different uses of the word "Parliament." To
urge the former in support of the omnipotence of the latter is
the same sort of argument as saying that Parliament can do
anything except bind its successors and to allow this statement
to go unanalyzed. Behind this statement are two assumptions
which pass sub silentio, the one that Parliament is omnipotent,
the other that its successor is omnipotent and cannot be bound
by a predecessor. It is not at all certain what a successor to
Parliament is: a Parliament, that is, which possesses legal personality and is a corporation or continuum. We have seen that
Bacon had difficulty in resolving this query and we have also
shown that the alleged rule means merely that one Parliament
such as the Model, the Good, the Long, the Rump cannot bind
another Parliament. In fact it has nothing to do with Parliament
as a Corporation. Blackstone is nearer citing some authority,
when he refers to Parliament before and after the Act of
Union with Scotland, btit recent judicial dicta in MacCormick v.
The Lord Advocate48 seem to be against him on this point. The
power of Parliament to change the religion is a matter which
caused great difficulty at the time, as the argument by Sir
Thomas More with Solicitor General Rich shows, 49 and it was
an argument which goes to the root of what is possible. How
far discussing what is possible or impossible affects the omni46. My argument is that Parliament, like the law, cannot do anything that
is not logically possible. They may produce pragmatic paradoxes, though not
logical paradoxes. This is brought out in the Rich-More examination. See note

49 infra. Bacon remarked in A Brief Discourse upon- the Commission of Bridewell, in 15 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 12 (Spedding etc. ed.) that statutes
were the "absolute decrees and absolute judgements of the Parliament." This involves the use of reason. It will he argued that reason would preclude the logically
impossible.
47. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160-61.
48. [19531 Scot. Sess. Cas. 396.
49. The following account I take from PICKTHORN,

EARLY TuDOR GOVERN-

MENT: HENRY VIII 261 (1951) : "Admit there were, sir (quoth Rich), an Act of
Parliament that all the Realm should take me for the King, would not you take
me for the King?" "Yes, sir (quoth Sir Thomas More), that would I." "I put the
case further (quoth Mr. Rich), that there were an Act of Parliament that all the
Realm should take me for the Pope; would then not you, Mr. More, take me for
the Pope?" "For answer (quoth Sir Thomas More) to your first case, the Parlia-
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potency of Parliament is difficult to answer. I do not think it
is necessary to defend Blackstone on this point, for if he is
right in his allegation that legislature and sovereignty are equivalent it would be academic not to concede the limitation of Parliament to what was possible as an objection to its supremacy or
sovereignty or indeed its omnipotence. In the writer's opinion a
limitation upon Parliament's powers is that as a continuum it
could not make law what is logically impossible. An act declaring that 2 and 2 made 5, or that the theorems of Euclidean
geometry did not follow from the axioms, or that the laws of
inference did not obtain in logic would be contrary to reason,
against the common law and void.
Blackstone, like Coke, deals with the privileges of Parliament, and compares Parliament as a court to other Courts. "For,

as every court of justice hath laws and customs for its direction,
some the civil and canon, some the common law, others their
own peculiar laws and customs, so the high court of parliament
hath also its own peculiar law. ' "' ° No one would deny these
competing jurisdictions and rivalries, and few could marvel at
the acquisitive fictions which filched jurisdiction from one court
to another. There was indeed some sense in which the common
law was in the words of Bacon jus dicere, and another mode of
lawmaking by Parliament jus dare, but both were viewed as
functions of a calculus, which calculus was "all laws" or law.
Blackstone in his distinction between declaring and making,
ment may well meddle with the state of temporal Princes; but to make answer to
your second case, I will put you this case, Suppose the Parliament would make
a law that God should not -be God would you then, Mr. Rich, say God were not
God?" "No, sir (quoth he), that would I not, since no Parliament may make any
such Law." "No more (said Sir Thomas More, as Mr. Rich reported of him) could
the Parliament make the King supreme head of the Church."
Roper's account of this conversation contains the impossibility argument.
ROPER, LIFE OF MORE xlvi (Lumby ed.).
Roper was the husband of More's
favorite daughter Margaret. For More's trial and death cf. 1 CASTELNAU,
MEMOIRS 415 (Brussels ed. 1731), translated in 8 CHARLES, LETTERS AND PAPERS
no. 996. More said he would be obliged to accept Rich as king by an act of
Parliament because he could give his consent to it; then he put the case of Parliament enacting that God was not God, and Rich answered, "Quia impossible
est fiendum quod deus non erat Deus," and went on to put the case of Supremacy,
to which More replied that it was not like title to the throne, "because a King
can be made by Parliament and deprived by Parliament, to which act every
subject being present at Parliament may give consent, but to the case of Supremacy the subject cannot be obliged because his consent cannot be given by
him at the Parliament, and although the King be accepted in England, yet very
many foreign parts do not affirm the same thing," PICKTHORN, EARLY TUDOR
GOVERNMENT: HENRY VIII 274-76 (1951), translating from HARPSFIELD, LIFE AND
DEATH OF SIR T. MORE (1932).
50. 1 BLACKSTONE, CO-MMENTARIES "163.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

interpolates a sense of rivalry5 1 and so of superiority and then
of supremacy and finally sovereignty to the law that is made.
This is noticeable when he next deals with the privileges of
Parliament and quotes Fortescue as follows: "The privileges
of parliament are likewise very large and indefinite. And therefore when in 31 Henry VI the house of lords propounded a
question to the judges concerning them, the chief justice, Sir
John Fortescue, in the name of his brethren, declared, 'that
they ought not to make answer to that question: for it hath
not been used aforetime that the justices should in any wise
determine the privileges of the high court of parliament. For
it is so high and mighty in its nature, that it may make law:
and that which is law, it may make no law: and the determination and knowledge of that privilege belongs to the lords of
parliament, and not to the justices.' "52 I do not see myself in
the power of Parliament to judge of its own privileges any
argument tending to make Parliament supreme. It was after
all the same rule before sovereignty became a notion or a
word bandied about by political theories. It was part of the
law of medieval England.
How far Blackstone's glosses on Coke's position were caused
by the Glorious Revolution and the establishment of the Prince
of Orange on the English Throne, or by the writing of Locke
and Montesquieu, and possibly Bodin, we do not propose to
trace. Suffice it to say that the Commentaries reflect a measure
of influence upon Blackstone imparted by the 1688 settlement
and the theories. The Act of Union with Scotland and the creation of a new Parliament, in some senses a successor to the old
English Parliament, gave some reality to discussions on whether
Parliament as a corporation could bind its successors. We shall
see from a discussion of MacCormick v. The Lord Advocate53
that, far from suggesting that Parliament as a Corporation or
the continuum cannot bind its successors, apparently it can,
though it is nevertheless true that Parliament cannot bind its
successors when it is- considered either as a session or as a
different elected body.
Some criticism of Blackstone's use of natural law as a let
or hindrance to the validity of positive laws has been made. It
51. "[P]ut in competition together."
52. 1 BLACKSTONE, COIMMENTARIES *164.
53. [1953] Scot. Sess. Cas. 396.
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is not curious nor odd that Blackstone propounding as he did a
command theory of law and a sovereign theory of Parliament
should have boggled at the implications of such an amalgam.
It was tantamount to the alleged theory of the Roman Empire
and the civilian law "quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem"
and it is a theory which has led jurisprudence into a discussion
of the relation of law and morals and the law that is and the
law that ought to be. Blackstone avoids the logical extension of
his view of the law and sovereignty by superimposing upon it
a recourse to the law of nature. 4 In this he was to call forth
the scorn and the wrath of Bentham. Had he interpreted Coke
and followed Bacon in considering that law as a calculus governed both King and people (including the representatives of
the people) and that when the good and safety of the kingdom
was in danger, or at the time of the breaking of nations, the
judges should be the arbiters of the law, he would not have
needed to erect the metaphysical superstructure of the law of
nature to keep Parliaments within their bounds. 5 Nor would
he have attributed to Parliament a doctrine of sovereignty.
54. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *39.
55. The problem of jurisprudence is at least in part to understand the conceptual scheme of the law, that is, the calculus of rights and duties, etc., and
the functions and variables contained in the rules. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS 40
(1959), arguing about individuals, puts the point with reference to physical
objects or particulars, to the effect that we identify particulars within a framework of a three-dimensional space and time scheme in which there are limitations
in observation. "Given a certain general feature of the conceptual scheme of particular-identification which we have, it follows that material bodies must be the
basic particulars.
"The form of this argument might possibly mislead. It is not that on the
one hand we have a conceptual scheme which presents us with a certain problem
of particular-identification; while on the other hand, there exist material objects
in sufficient richness and strength to make possible the solution of such problems. It is only 'because the solution is possible that the problem exists. So
with all transcendental arguments." If jurisprudence is an attempt to describe
the leges leguma out of the placita legum, the laws of laws out of the particulars of
laws, in Bacon's language, it is well to remember that there is "a general character of the conceptual scheme" of the law and the legal system which might
limit our power to classify or individuate or identify particulars in the same

way as Strawson describes our difficulties in identifying particulars, as follows:
"First, is there a class or category of particulars such that, as things are,
it would not be possible to make all the identifying references which we do
make to particulars of other classes, unless we made identifying references
to particulars of that class, whereas it would be possible to make all the identifying references we do make to particulars of that class without making identifying
reference to particulars of other classes? Second, can we argue to an affirmative
answer to this question from the general character of the conceptual scheme
have described?" Id. at 38.
Implicit in this argument concerning sovereignty is the understanding of the
calculus of rights with its functions and variables, which makes up the "general
character" of the (legal) conceptual scheme. It is a game analogous to the
"language game" of Wittgenstein, having different rules for proof vertification,
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PART III. DICEY'S THEORY

Between Blackstone and Dicey, who first wrote Law of the
Constitution in 1885, fall the utilitarians Bentham and Austin.
They both propounded a positivist theory of law, a command
from a Sovereign enforced by a sanction. It is not my purpose
here to criticize either Austin or Bentham, but merely to remark their existence and influence. Our concern is with Dicey
whose work Law of the Constitution, expounding his theory of
the Sovereignity of Parliament, has become a classic for those
reading that spurious branch of law, constitutional law. Dicey's
work is to be commended and conlemned-commended because
he conceives that there are two accounts of sovereignty, a legal
account and a political account, and because he shows, not quite
as cogently as Buckland in his Reflections of Jurisprudence,that
Austin erred in mixing up a legal and a political concept. Dicey
is to be condemned, however, not merely for his somewhat infantile treatment of the political concept of sovereignty, but
for falling into confusion over his legal treatment of the legal
concept of sovereignty.
His discussion is not very clear. He uses the notion of
"law" and "fact." A legal fact is a fact, a particular or series
or group of particulars of which the law takes notice. The
law takes judicial notice of matters not requiring evidence.
Dicey does not say whether sovereignty is a fact or a series or
group of facts which the law notices upon evidence. He does
not say whether it is fact or law, or finally whether it is placitum
legum a particular of law, a rule of law, or one of the rules
which form part of the complex calculus. After stating that
sovereignty is a legal fact, Dicey quotes Blackstone, including
evidence, causation, authority, and precedent from other disciplines. See, for
example, Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in 57 ARISTOTELIAN SOC'ETY, PROCEEDINGS
14 (1956-57). See also HART & HONORSt, CAUSATION AND THE LAW (1959).
The fallacy, which causes unclearness is derived from the making of logical
translations from one discipline to another, without appreciating either that a
translation is ;being made, or the significance of what is being done in making
the translation. This is a point which has occurred to philosophers, but not to
jurists or political theorists. In cases themselves, half the difficulty for judge
and counsel is to translate at the point of intersection the language of, say, a
psychiatrist in a murder trial into the language of the law, commonly that of

M'Naghten's rule, into the language of ordinary speech for a jury. In the nineteenth century the coalescence of ordinary words, medical words, and legal words
obfuscated the distinction between these disciplines, and so obscured the fact
that some logical translation was being made. For general literature, see Berlin,
Logical Translations, in ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, PROCEEDINGS (1950) ; BRAITHWAITE, SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION ch. iv. See also Stone, Logical Translations in
the Law, 49 MINN. L. REV. 447 (1965).
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the citation of Coke. 58 He notices no distinction between Coke's
treatment and Blackstone's interpolation. He accepts without
demur Blackstone's interpretation and also the confusion between Parliament and a session of Parliament, and the length
of a Parliament from election to dissolution in citing the example
in support of Parliamentary supremacy. He also accepts that
they are in competition one with the other. He does not conceive
that they are two sources of law, that complex calculus of rules,
functions, etc., which he so forcefully enunciated in his Rule of
Law.
Dicey describes parliamentary sovereignty as follows: "The
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more or
less than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under
the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law
whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognized by
the law of England as having a right to override or set aside
the legislation of Parliament. 5 7 Dicey here says that parliamentary sovereignty is recognized by the law. He does not develop this suggestion, nor does he define what law he has in
mind. In view of his analysis, it is hardly the common law, nor
would we suppose that it could be. We submit that it is that law
which is a calculus of those sources including statute, common
law, custom, etc.; perhaps it is a hint at the "rule of law." In
support of this thesis Dicey next cites Blackstone and draws
support from: "This supreme legislative authority of Parliament is shown historically in a large number of instances."5 8
1. The descent of the Crown was varied and finally fixed
under the provisions of the Act of Parliament whereby the
King occupies the throne under a Parliamentary title.59
2. He quotes 6 Anne, c. 7, a statute dealing with the King's
title, and making it treasonable to doubt it.60
3. "An Act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject,
and settling the succession of the Crown ;61
4. "One other Act made in England in the twelfth year of the
reign of his said late Majesty King William the Third, in56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See text at note 45 8upra.
DIcEY,

LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION

Id. at 41.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

38 (5th ed. 1897).
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tutled, An Act for the further limitation of the Crown, and
better securing the rights and liberties of the subjects.

'6

2

These acts concern Parliament and the powers of Parliament as a continuum or corporation. The next act cited might
be argued to concern Parliament as such a continuum or corporation, and its powers to create a successor to itself as such a
continuum or corporation-a successor both as a legislative and
as a constituent assembly. As to the judicial interpretation of
this act see MacCormick v. The Lord Advocate."
5. "The Acts lately made in England and Scotland mutually for
the union of the two kingdoms."'
Dicey's comment on this act and its apposition with his introductory remarks on the Septennial Act are worth noting in
full.
"The Acts of Union (to one of which Blackstone calls attention) afford a remarkable example of the exertion of Parliamentary authority. But there is no single statute which is more
significant either as to the theory or as to the practical working
of the constitution than the Septennial Act. The circumstances
of its enactment and the nature of the Act itself merit therefore
special attention." 65
Dicey does not expound how remarkable an example of parliamentary authority the Act of Union was, nor does he draw a
distinction between Parliament qua corporation and Parliament
extending its duration, that is one Parliament extending its own
life, although in his discussion of the Septennial Act he uses
this expression. He ignores utterly the distinction between the
powers of Parliament contained in the preceding acts which
involve questions of creating successors to itself, or changes in
the Constitution, and the purely law-making functions of a legislature, a High Court of, Parliament extending its own life
within the rule of that complex calculus known as the law.
Parliamentary sovereignty, as applied to the last part, seems
merely to mean that the complex calculus is changed, in that one
of the rules or functions of the calculus is changed by altering
3 to 7 in the appropriate rule governing the dissolution of a
62.
63.
64.
65.

Ibid.
(1953] Scot. Sess. Cas. 396.
DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 42 (5th ed. 1897).
Ibid.
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Parliament. It does not alter the criteria by which we are
to judge what are the sources of law, that is, what are the
sources of the rules and functions of the calculus itself.
6. Triennial and Septennial Acts.
Dicey's pertinent comment on the Septennial Act was "What
was startling was that an existing Parliament of its own authority prolonged its own legal existence . .. To under-rate this
exertion of authority is to deprive the Septennial Act of its
true constitutional importance. That Act proves to demonstration that in a legal point of view Parliament is neither the agent
of the electors nor in any sense a trustee for its constituents.
It is legally the sovereign legislative power in the state, and the
Septennial Act is at once the result and the standing proof of
such Parliamentary sovereignty." 66
Here we find the shift from treating Parliament as Parliament, and a Parliament as a Parliament, to Parliament as a
Parliament and a Parliament as Parliament. Deducing from the
power to extend the life of a Parliament a sovereignty in Parliament to do all things except to bind its successors, as the
phrase goes, is a jump in violation of logic. It may be an argument from an analogy but it is not an argument which is logically
deduced. The analogy may have force, though, in view of the
query of Bacon and subsequent thought on the matter contained
in MacCormick v. The Lord Advocate, it is doubtful whether
the analogy is either apposite or forceful.
7. The Indemnity Acts.
These acts made legal what was illegal and operated sometimes ex post facto and sometimes in futuro. They seem to me
to be like any other statute and are merely a source of law. I
see no difference between an indemnity act, a repealing act, an
enabling act, a consolidating act or a declaratory act. When
the Law of Property Act abolished the rule, in Shelley's Case,67
when the Act of the Long Parliament declared that the case of
Ship Money was wrongly decided, they were doing neither more
nor less than the Indemnity Acts did. What they were doing
was adding a new rule or function to the complex calculus, and
they were doing no more than a decision at the House of Lords
66. Id. at 44-45.
67. 1 Co. Rep. 88b (1581).
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overruling a case or the Court of Exchequer Chamber sitting
in error overruling a case. Dicey's comment, however, "that
such enactments being as it were the legalisation of illegality
are the highest exertion and crowning proof of sovereign
power"6 8 stems from the view that the sources of law are rivals
and in competition, and this is inherent in his view next explained, and no doubt derived from Blackstone, that there is
in our Constitution an absence of any competing legislative
power. He expresses it thus. "The King, each House of Parliament, the Constituencies, and the Law Courts, either have at
one time claimed or might appear to claim, independent legislative power."6 9 It will be found, however, on examination that
the claim can in none of these cases be made good. This diagnosis is not a matter of history, but a profound jurisprudential
misconception contained in the competitive idea of conflicting
jurisdiction. Maitland's phrase summing up the rivalry between
equity and common law suffices as a comment on Dicey's heresy.
"Equity had come not to destroy the law but to fulfil it. ' ' 70 It is
difficult without an understanding of the jurisprudential account of theory and. definition in jurisprudence and that cited
from Marshall's ParliamentarySovereignty, on the one hand,
and a profound understanding of the internal relations and
constructs of law and particularly the English legal system,
on the other, to realize that the dynamism of the law countenances variables as well as constants, conflicts, doubts, queries,
and inconsistencies as well as rules, certainties. Coke might
speak of the King's Bench as sovereign and superior and such
a description would lead us to ask what rules he had in mind
as particularly appropriate to the jurisdiction of the King's
Bench, and not to ask questions about the nature of sovereignty
and supremacy, whether it is external or internal, limited or
unlimited. The interplay of rules leads not to conclusions about
the absolute nature or essence of one rule but merely to the
recognition of its relevancy to another or other rules. In the
history of English.law, particularly in the seventeenth century,
we find the common law courts settling the rules whose interrelation and whose relativity the' law as a complex calculus is
founded upon, the common law judges largely creating this
jurisprudence and often declaring not merely the common law
68. DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 48 (5th ed. 1897).
69. Ibid.
70. MAITLAND, LECTURES ON EQUITY 17 (1916).
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but that law of which the common law is one of the sources.
There were appeals to some law that was fundamental or transcendent in cases submitted to the common law courts and a
fundamental or transcendent law was not such that it could be
articulated within the jurisdiction and so the jurisprudential
framework of the common law courts. The tendency of the
common law judges was to declare, according to common law,
what was often a matter for that law of which the common law
and custom and statute were the sources. What judges do and
what the King in Parliament does, when they make or declare
laws, is to fix the rules and functions or write new rules and
functions within the jurisdictional area of their own competence
and leave it to a jurist to describe the complex calculus; as
Bacon put it, to describe the leges legum from the placita legum.
When this is understood the sovereignty of Parliament theory
becomes a shibboleth. Dicey was right, however, when he distinguished between a legal account of sovereignty and a political
account of sovereignty, but not in finding what the legal sovereign was nor, indeed, what the political sovereign was. In the
cases he next cites concerning legal sovereignty he consistently
misinterprets the question, and this again because he is concerned with the rivalry of competitive or supposedly competitive
legislative power. He attributes the Sovereignty of Parliament to
"the absence of any competing legislative power.-The King,
each House of Parliament, the Constituencies, and the Law
Courts, either have at one time claimed, or might appear to
claim, independent legislative power. It will be found however
on examination that the claim can in none of these cases be
made good."7 These matters can be dealt with shortly. The
power of the Crown is raised and knocked down by a short and
by no means complete account of the Statute of Proclamations
and the common law rules relating to proclamations. That the
King cannot do more by proclamation than he could at common
law is of course the position which the common law provides and
is in this sense no statutory limit upon the King. Theorists,
obsessed with the competition between law making and law
declaring, throw into acute relief the history and nature of
proclamations. Parliament passed the Statute of Proclamations
in the reign of Henry VIII, and it is very doubtful whether,
pending the duration of this act, it could be said that the King
was in any sense more or less sovereign than either before the
71.
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act or after its repeal. All that the act did was to enable the
new rules .to be written into the legal calculus by another source.
The Case of Proclamationsin 1610 is relied on by Dicey to show
that Parliament is supreme and sovereign in some sense over
the King. He argues that Parliament is sovereign over the King.
He relies on the claim that the King cannot declare illegal what
is lawful at common law. Coke decided this matter with the
common law judges in the Case of Proclamationsand this within
72
a few years of another decision of Coke's in Bonham's case
that common law could adjudge void a statute repugnant to
the common law. Perhaps there is some historical development
which Dicey does not systematically discuss and which, perhaps,
if Dicey's book is to be at all jurisprudential, he does not need
to discuss. Perhaps the distinction between the legislative and
judicial functions has become so much a part of Dicey's conceptual scheme that he retrospectively imposes it, albeit obliquely, upon 17th century cases-"a typical mistake of the Whig
interpretation of history."
In discussing the legal position of resolutions of either House
of Parliament, Dicey again sets up the competitive thesis, and
of course manages to knock it down. He does this by quoting a
judgment of Mr. Justice Stephen, a part of which is illuminating in that it shows that there is none of this competitive rivalry
in this learned Judge's conceptual scheme.
" 'I do not say that the resolution of the House is the judgment of a Court not subject to our revision; but it has much in
common with such a judgment. The House of Commons is not
a Court of Justice; but the effect of its privilege to regulate its
own internal concerns, practically invests it with a judicial character when it has to apply to particular cases the provisions of
Acts of Parliament. We must presume that it discharges this
function properly, and with due regard to the laws, in the
making of which it has so great a share. If its determination is
not in accordance with law, this resembles the case of an error
by a judge whose decision is not subject to appeal. There is
nothing startling in the recognition of the fact that such an error
is possible. If, for instance, a jury in a criminal case give a
perverse verdict, the law has provided no remedy. The maxim
that there is no wrong without a remedy, does not mean, as it
is sometimes supposed, that there is a legal remedy for every
72. 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.B. 1610).
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moral or political wrong. If this were its meaning, it would be
manifestly untrue. There is no legal remedy for the breach of a
solemn promise not under seal, and made without consideration;
nor for many kinds of verbal slander, though each may involve
utter ruin; nor for oppressive legislation, though it may reduce
men practically to slavery; nor for the worst damage to person
and property inflicted by the most unjust and cruel war. The
maxim means only that legal wrong and legal remedy are correlative terms; and it would be more intelligibly and correctly
stated, if it were reversed, so as to stand, "Where there is no
legal remedy, there is no legal wrong." ' ,7 3 It is significant that
Stephen uses the words "in regard to the law, in the making
of which it has so large a share." The tenor of the judgment is
moderate. It is significant that Stephen talks "of the making"
of the law and attributes to Parliament a share. Although it
were better not to use the metaphor "make" or "declare" Stephen
uses "make" 74 in the sense of Bracton's legat, and does not import
the Blackstonian dichotomy into his words. In consequence the
word "share" is all the more significant in that according to
Dicey's recognition of legal sovereignty, the legal sovereign does
not "share" in law-making power.
Dicey's next rhetorical argument is to set up the proposition
that the courts of law make laws. This he proceeds to knock
down on the very spurious Blackstonian argument that judges
declare and do not make laws. The passage which I consider
objectionable contains these overtones of the Blackstonian dichotomy and Austinian jurisprudence, and the idea implicit in
Dicey's conceptual scheme that the sovereign, that is the legal
sovereign, is any person or group of persons who can change
the law. It is significant that Dicey uses legislate, make, change,
repeal, as words appropriate to the judicial process, which he
merely refers to by mention of Pollock's Essays in Jurisprudence
and Ethics and does not examine, explore or analyze.
Dicey states: "All that we need note is that the adhesion
by our judges to precedent, that is, their habit of deciding one
case in accordance with the principle, or supposed principle,
73. DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 53 (5th ed. 1897).

74. Recently, Shaw v. D.P.P. (1962] A.C. 220 has
of conspiring to prevent public marches. Thus a decision
has put a new crime in the criminal case law. D.P.P. v.
(H.L.) interpreted a section of the H-lomicide'Act of 1957
said that the House of Lords overruled a statute.

created a new offense
of the House of Lords
Smith [1961] A.C. 290
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which governed a former case, leads inevitably to the gradual
formation by the Courts of fixed rules for decision, which are
in effect laws. This judicial legislation might appear, at first
sight, inconsistent with the supremacy of Parliament. But this
is not so. English judges do not claim or exercise any power to
repeal a Statute, whilst Acts of Parliament may override and
constantly do override the law of the judges."7 5 What the effect
of judicial interpretation upon an act of Parliament amounts to,
that is, alteration, amendment, repeal, addition, extension, or
interpretation, is not discussed. The Statute De donis Conditionalibus was limited to heirs in the fourth degree by a remarkable judicial interpolation in that Hengham, C. J. had omitted
certain words from the draft through carelessness, and these
were judicially interpreted as if included. Judicial construction
of finance acts, and indeed of the Statute of Uses, affords some
case for saying that judges, in a loose sense, can change and
certainly control an act of Parliament. In our view of the law,
because of the absence of a competitive rivalry, there would
be no need to use the word change or control. We would
merely understand the operation of the appropriate rules. Dicey,
however, does use the dichotomy make and declare, jus dare
and jus dicere. Consequently without much difficulty he can
then assert "judicial legislation is, in short, subordinate legislation, carried on with the assent and subject to the supervision
of Parliament," 6 a deduction derived from false premises at
worst, or an induction made from insufficient evidence at best.
Dicey then goes on to consider whether Parliament is in
fact the legal sovereign in the Austinian sense of sovereign, that
is to say, some person, or combination of persons, which according to the Constitution, whatever its form, can legally change
every law, and theiefore "constitutes the legally supreme power
in the state."
Austin, of course, did not consistently use this test and, as
both Dicey and Buckland have pointed out, he hopelessly confused legal and political sovereignty. Dicey, however, at this
point is quite clear what sovereignty means to him, and he
proceeds to set up arguments showing that none of the suggestions addressed to the problem of limiting this sense of sovereignty stands examination. The suggested limitations are (1)
75. DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 57-58 (5th ed. 1897).

76. Id. at 58.
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Blackstone's suggestion that laws against morals, international
law, and the law of nature are void, (2) the prerogative and (3)
the preceding act of Parliament. None of these shall I discuss
here. The most interesting is that under (3), but because of
Dicey's confusion about the meanings of the word Parliament,
much of his discussion is beside the mark. His most important
contribution is that concerning the Act of Union, where it is
possible to suggest that Parliament as a corporation, as a springing and shifting continuum endowed with a legal personality,
could have abolished itself as the English Parliament and
recreated a successor to itself as a Parliament of the United
Kingdom. How far therefore the Act of Union limited the
powers of the successor to the Parliament which passed the
act is of some interest, and upon this point there are dicta in the
Scottish case of MacCormick v. The Lord Advocate,71 which are
of interest: "The principle of the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a distinctively English principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law. It derives its origin from
Coke and Blackstone, and was widely popularised during the
nineteenth century by Bagehot and Dicey, the latter having
stated the doctrine in its classic form in his Law of the Constitution. Considering that the Union legislation extinguished the
Parliaments of Scotland and England and replaced them by
a new Parliament, I have difficulty in seeing why it should
have been supposed that the new Parliament of Great Britain
must inherit all the peculiar characteristics of the English
Parliament but none of the Scottish Parliament, as if all that
happened in 1707 was that Scottish representatives were admitted to the Parliament of England. That is not what was
done. Further, the Treaty and the associated legislation, by
which the Parliament of Great Britain was brought into being
as the successor of the separate Parliaments of Scotland and
England, contain some clauses which expressly reserve to the
Parliament of Great Britain powers of subsequent modification,
and other clauses which either contain no such power or emphatically exclude subsequent alteration by declarations that
the provision shall be fundamental and unalterable in all time
coming, or declarations of a like effect. I have never been able
to understand how it is possible to reconcile with elementary
canons of construction the adoption by the English constitutional
77. [1953] Scot. Sess. Cas. 396.
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theorists of the same attitude to these markedly different types
'78
of provisions.
How far the Lord President Cooper was justified in attributing to Coke the same constitutional theory which Blackstone,
Bagehot, and Dicey propounded, is questionable. It is my contention that giving maximum effect to Coke's argument as
to the transcendent nature of Parliament, his conception of the
law as a calculus whose sources included statutes, the common
law, and custom, and his views about the fundamental nature
of Magna Carta, might easily have enabled him to support as
binding, the Act of Union, entrenching as it did certain fundamental unalterable provisions. It is significant that the Lord
President found that, "This at least is plain, that there is
neither precedent nor authority of any kind for the view that
the domestic Courts of either Scotland or England have jurisdiction to determine whether a governmental act of the type here
in controversy is or is not conform to the provisions of a Treaty,
least of all when that Treaty is one under which both Scotland
and England ceased to be independent states and merged their
identity in an incorporating union. From the standpoint both
of constitutional law and of international law the position appears to me to be unique."7 9 Cases such as Dalkeith Ry. v.
Warchope8' and Ellen Street Estates, Ltd. v. Minister of
Health l are not concerned with this problem, but only with the
problem of whether one act of a Parliament can bind a future
act of a Parliament, both Parliaments "in this sense" being sessions of Parliament from the election to dissolution, and not
Parliament as a Corporation enjoying a legal personality. It is
only in the sense of the English Parliament and its successor the
United Kingdom Parliament that MacCormick v. The Lord Advocate and Harris v. Minister of the Interior have any relevancy. 2 The questions decided in the former line of cases have
nothing to do with the latter, and the latter seem to me to
decide that there is a legal concept to sovereignty, that the
precedents are few, that there is nothing in legal theory disenabling the courts from articulating in the future more precise criteria of the legal sovereignty. Such a conception might
78. Id.
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contain the feature that a legal sovereign could be sovereign,
although not entirely free or unlimited from and by the provisions constituting it sovereign. It is thought that the Harris
case has gone some way to support this view. I see no reason
either to resort to academic logic or to political reality when
legal ratiocination can articulate a concept of legal sovereignty.
The great query is whether there is jurisdiction either in the
Scots' courts or the English courts, to hear matters arising out
of the treaty of the Act of Union. There seems no authority
either way in modern times and perhaps the question which
was once mooted in the great case of Ship-Money8 as affecting
the King's prerogative may be played in aid as affecting such a
constitutional act of the legislature. Certainly without jurisdiction it would be hard to develop a jurisprudence. One way of
affording the courts jurisdiction will be to re-examine the law
and the Constitution afresh without the influence of Blackstone
and particularly Dicey.
In discussing the Act of Union, Dicey modified his strict
Austinian view about the nature of sovereignty being illimitable
and owing nothing to a superior. The Lord President. Cooper,
in the MacCormick case, cites the relevant passage.
"The statesmen of 1707, though giving full sovereign power
to the Parliament of Great Britain, clearly believed in the
possibility of creating an absolutely sovereign Legislature which
' 84
should yet be bound by unalterable laws.
This idea that the imperial legislature might limit the sovereignty of a Dominion legislature is exactly the point in the
Harris case. Dicey at least hints here at some legal conception
.of limited sovereignty, and very properly suggests that seventeenth century lawyers might not have been so entrenched in
the conceptual scheme of a sovereign being absolute and unlimited or free and independent. Neither Bodin nor Austin
completely entrenched legal thought until the nineteenth century.
Dicey's comment upon the suggestion that sovereignty might be
limited is, however, strange. The suggestion that the sovereign
legislature might yet be bound by unalterable laws suggests
that there is some legal limit to sovereignty, but he soon resiles
from this position into talk about moral and political limits
83. 3 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS 825.
84. [1953] Scot. Sess. Cas. 396, 412.
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to sovereignty. The point that by Austin's definition of legal
sovereign we are inextricably bound by an inescapable logic to
admit that sovereignty is illimitable carries little weight when
Dicey has seen that there is at least one example of a sovereign,
and the very sovereign about which Austin thought he was
writing, itself being limited. Dicey should have re-examined
Austin's definition. Instead, he treats it not for what it is
worth, but rather for what it pretends to be.
"It represents the conviction of the Parliament which passed
the Act of Union that the Act for the security of the Church
of Scotland ought to be morally or constitutionally unchangeable
even by the British Parliament . . .A sovereign Parliament in
short, though it cannot be logically bound to abstain from chanking any given law, may by the fact that an Act when it was
passed had been declared to be unchangeable, receive a warning that it cannot be changed without grave danger to the Constitution of the country."8' 5
"Morally" and "constitutionally" are strange words to
import into a legal discussion, and oddly enough constitutionally
is perhaps the odder, because it imports some sense of legality,
and some sense of the politic into a discussion which should at
least distinguish between those elements of sovereignty which
are legal, and those which are political. The word constitutional
seems to me to blur two separate logics, that of law and that
of politics, and the logical translation from one logic to the other
is often unnoticed. Dicey diagnoses it in Austin, but suffers
from the same disorder himself. The force of the sentence that
the "sovereign Parliament cannot be logically bound to abstain
from changing any given law" harks back to Austin's definition
of legal sovereign. It refers also to the idea that political pressure and political sagacity are limits upon legal sovereignty.
This is naive, in that it mixes up two different logics. Dicey's
dilemma, which he did not resolve, was on the one hand to realize that Austin's definition was not empirically verifiable because of the Act of Union, and on the other hand to judge that
Austin's definition was a priori true, and Dicey's own deductions
from such a definition logically followed. This uneasiness, which
dominated nineteenth century jurisprudence Dicey sought to
resolve by reference to non-legal concepts and quasi-legal constructs, such as the Conventions of the Constitution. It is para85. DICEY, THOUGHTS ON THE SCOTTISH UNION 252-53.
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doxical that Dicey's discussion of sovereignty should lead to the
conclusion that it is the rule of law and not Parliament which
is the legal sovereign. Dicey, of course, never suggested that
his formulation of the rule of law was in any sense sovereign,
because in the Austinian definition of sovereign there must be
a person or body of persons. I do not see any evidence or argument for this requirement, but that is another question. All I
wish to show here is the curious misinterpretation and interpolation of a sound Seventeenth century legal theory, by Eighteenth
and Nineteenth century writers in the face of the evidence
against the weight of argument and in spite of authority.

